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Abstract 
Whereas ecological economists argue strongly in favor of incentive-based approaches to pro-
mote renewable energy sources and reduce energy consumption, those instruments have been 
shown to be particularly difficult to implement politically. We begin with a recognition that cost 
perceptions that inherently characterize incentive-based policy instruments are a fundamental 
reason for their unpopularity. We therefore argue that the crucial question that policymakers 
need to address is how the benefit-cost ratios of incentive-based instruments can be altered in 
ways such that their inherent costs become acceptable. By focusing on the various features of 
these instruments, we propose three strategies for answering this question theoretically: objec-
tively reduce the costs, reduce the visibility of the costs, and identify compensation strategies, 
i.e., strengthen the benefit side of the equation. Based on a conjoint analysis for Switzerland, 
our results demonstrate that reducing objective and perceived costs may indeed strengthen sup-
port for incentive-based policy instruments, whereas cost compensation does not seem to work 
as well. We show, moreover, that the latter can be explained by the fact that substantial numbers 
of voters do not understand or are not convinced by the commonly proposed mechanism of en-
vironmental taxes. Given that voters do not believe in the usefulness and efficacy of incentive-
based policy measures, no cost compensation is feasible. 
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1. Introduction 
Transitioning from fossil fuels and nuclear energy to a renewable energy age is a challenge for 
many industrialized countries. In addition to scientific progress, one of the main concerns is 
how to implement and promote new technologies and solutions politically. In this context, many 
countries have introduced “soft policies” (Carattini et al. 2016), for instance, voluntary self-
regulation (Baranzini and Thalmann 2004; Ingold 2008) or traditional subsidies for renewable 
energies (Marcantonini and Ellerman 2014), which, however, are either not effective enough in 
terms of goal attainment or financially very expensive. By contrast, incentive-based steering 
mechanisms (e.g., incentives or environmental taxes) are widely acknowledged to be the most 
effective and economically efficient instruments, since they generate continuous and long-term 
incentives for environmentally friendly innovation and practices (Baranzini et al. 2015; Caratti-
ni et al. 2016; Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006; Jaffe et al. 2002; Mauch et al. 1992; Perry and 
Williams 1999; Rausch and Karplus 2014; Vollebergh 2007).  
However, policymakers only recently have given more attention to such incentive-based 
approaches, whereas conventional environmental regulations (i.e., rules and bans) tend to be 
more popular with respect to practical implementation (Felder and Schleiniger 2002; 
Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003). One important reason for the difference is that the introduc-
tion of incentive-based policy approaches is particularly difficult, mainly owing to problems of 
social acceptance and political feasibility (Dresner et al. 2006, p. 896). In fact, voters seem to 
prefer regulation and prohibition to market-oriented policies (Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006; 
Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003, 375; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011). That aspect of the policy 
problem is particularly relevant in political contexts that integrate citizens directly into the poli-
cy-making process by means of direct democracy. Previous research has documented that citi-
zens in their role as veto players are very reluctant to accept renewable energy policies in gen-
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eral, and incentive-based instruments in particular (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011; Thalmann 2004). 
Typically, this dilemma has been attributed to the cost factors that heavily impact individual 
vote decisions (Bornstein and Lanz 2008), but also to the fact that people fail to understand the 
logic and benefits of these instruments (Carattini et al. 2016).1 
The present study aims at gaining a better understanding of why citizens do not support 
incentive-based policy instruments promoting renewable energy and reductions in energy con-
sumption, and also whether and how their popularity might be increased. Previous research has 
demonstrated that the cost perceptions related to incentive-based policy instruments are one of 
the main reasons why those instruments are so unpopular (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003, p. 
375; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann 2002; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011). However, since 
the costs, i.e., typically new or higher taxes, are a fundamental and inherent feature of such pol-
icies, they cannot be avoided when attempting to increase their popularity. Hence, in this paper, 
we argue that the crucial question that policy makers need to address is how the unpopular costs 
of a policy proposal can either be reduced or compensated for. In other words, the following is 
the main research question of the present study: Which features of incentive-based policy in-
struments can alter the cost-benefit equation in a way that inherent costs become acceptable? 
Incentive-based instruments, in this article, are conceptualized as incentive packages that 
contain a tax and/or a subsidy. From the citizens’ perspective these instruments therefore have a 
cost side (generating some revenues for the state) and a benefit side (related to how the revenues 
are spent/redistributed by the state). Thus, our main interest is on the specific design of a policy, 
i.e., the elements of a policy instrument (Howlett et al. 2009). Policy instruments have been 
                                                          
1 In a similar vein, also some (usually large) firms in the energy industry prefer command and 
control regulations to taxes because the former can be influenced to gain competitive ad-
vantages over their smaller rivals. 
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defined as the measures of state action adopted to solve a political problem (Cairney 2011). In 
the literature, in addition to persuasive measures, the main distinction is between incentive-
based and regulatory policies (Vedung 1998). In the following sections, we argue that to explain 
policy support (by citizens), we need to go beyond this dichotomy and consider the various el-
ements of a policy proposal more specifically (see also Kemp and Pontogio 2011; Vollebergh 
2007, p. 3). For example, the design of an energy tax has many possibilities. First, the question 
arises as to what is taxed, i.e., fuels and combustibles, electricity coming from non-renewable 
sources or electricity in general. Second, a tax can vary as to whom is taxed, i.e., consumers 
and/or producers. Third, the tax rate can be higher or lower. Fourth, the revenues collected 
through such taxes can be spent differently: the money can be allocated to promote renewable 
electricity production, or it could be redistributed to citizens (in different ways). These brief 
examples show that one policy proposal contains myriad dimensions, out of which some may be 
more popular, whereas others may be contested.  
The present study contributes to the existing literature in three respects. First, theoreti-
cally, it combines public choice reasoning about individual cost-benefit calculations with an 
understanding of policy support as involving multidimensional choices. That approach not only 
helps to provide an understanding of an instrument’s low popularity, but also involves some 
strategies for policy design that may help to increase public support for these instruments. Sec-
ond, and relatedly, the present study conceptually proposes a decomposed perspective on incen-
tive-based policy instruments by focusing on their various elements. Such a strategy accords 
with previous research concluding that the impact of environmental policy instruments may 
depend more on design features than the general instrument type itself (Kemp and Pondogio 
2011, p. 34). We expand that reasoning to the social acceptance of incentive-based instruments. 
Third, empirically, we present the results from a novel, large-scale representative survey from 
Switzerland. A forced-choice paired conjoint analysis (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 
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2014) enables us to evaluate how specific aspects of an incentive-based policy proposal influ-
ence individual support for or rejection of a whole proposal. Our approach helps us to identify 
the drivers and red lines for the popular support of a proposal. The Swiss case is particularly 
suitable in this respect, since citizens—owing to the frequency of direct-democratic ballots—are 
familiar with this kind of personal decision-making and with indicating their support or rejec-
tion of (alternative) policy solutions. Furthermore, by using our experimental approach, we are 
not limited to already existing policy solutions, but rather are able to take an ex-ante perspective 
on citizens’ voting preferences in the near future. 
The remainder of the present study is structured as follows. In the following section, we 
present our theoretical framework by discussing different mechanisms that may alter the bene-
fit-cost ratio of incentive-based renewable energy policy instruments. Next, we introduce the 
methodological approach, the data and their operationalization. In section 4, we present our em-
pirical findings. The study ends with a summary of the most important results and conclusions. 
 
2. Theory 
As mentioned in the introduction, the starting point of this study is a puzzle regarding the choice 
of policy instruments for environmental policy in general and energy policy in particular. In that 
context, environmental economists argue strongly in favor of incentive-based approaches 
(Carattini et al. 2016; Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006; Jaffe et al. 2002; Mauch et al. 1992). What 
is most important, incentive-based policy instruments are considered to be most effective for 
environmental protection in the long-run, since they generate continuous and long-term incen-
tives for environmentally friendly innovation and practices.2 Moreover, some researchers have 
                                                          
2 However, empirically, the superiority of incentive-based instruments is less clear. For exam-
ple, it has been shown that the effectiveness of incentive-based instruments may be limited re-
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argued for the economic advantages of incentive-based approaches (Carrattini et al. 2016; 
OECD 2008; Rausch et al. 2014). However, such policy instruments have been shown to be 
particularly difficult to implement politically, whereas conventional regulatory approaches (i.e., 
rules and bans) tend to be more popular for purposes of practical implementation (Felder and 
Schleiniger 2002; Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003). Moreover, voters seem to prefer policies 
of regulation and prohibition over market-oriented policies; so, too, do regulated firms 
(Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006; Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003, p. 375; Stadelmann-Steffen 
2011).  
Scholars have demonstrated that the cost perceptions that characterize incentive-based 
policy instruments are a fundamental reason for their unpopularity. Based on the public choice 
approach, Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003, p. 375) have argued that with respect to environ-
mental policy, voters generally must choose between a better quality environment (in the future) 
and a higher real income today, and they tend to prefer the latter (see also Bornstein and Lanz 
2008). In general, that preference may lead to an insufficient supply of environmental policies. 
Moreover, the individual cost-benefit calculation may be biased towards traditional regulatory 
policies in which costs are less visible to voters compared to incentive-based instruments: “vot-
ers may have the impression that an improvement of the environment could be reached by 
means of regulations and prohibitions without costs, i.e., without reducing the income of the 
average citizen” (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003, p. 375). That “cost-illusion” (Schulz 2011) 
implies that traditional policies are perceived to be more equitable and fairer (Deroubaix and 
Lévèque 2006, p. 947).  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
garding large-scale innovations (e.g., Kemp and Pontogio 2011) and, more generally, because 
of a rather inelastic demand for energy in the short-run (OECD 2006, p. 50).  
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To put it bluntly, the nature of environmental policy in general and incentive-based in-
struments in particular lead to a situation in which the costs related to a policy proposal are im-
mediately tangible and visible for individual households, whereas the potential benefits of the 
policy are much less so. In the following section, we begin with a recognition that the costs, i.e., 
typically new or higher taxes, are an inherent feature of such policies. Thus, the crucial question 
that arises is how the individual benefit-cost calculation related to incentive-based instruments 
can be altered to raise support for those instruments. By focusing on the various elements of 
such instruments, we propose three strategies for answering that question: objectively reduce 
the costs, reduce the visibility of the costs, and offer compensation, i.e., strengthen the benefit 
side of the equation. 
 
2.1 Reducing objective costs 
The most obvious way to reduce the visible costs is to really reduce the costs. Thus, lower tax 
rates bring the personal costs of the policy down and increase the probability that the individual 
benefit-cost ratio will be positive. Previous research has demonstrated that popular support for 
green taxes is greater when the tax is small and many exceptions are available, e.g., for energy-
intensive firms (Buchanan and Tullock 1975; Thalmann 2004). Although that strategy may 
make incentive-based instruments more socially acceptable, it also may reduce the environmen-
tal impact of those instruments, a tradeoff that typically characterizes environmental policy in-
struments (Goulder & Parry 2008; OECD 2008, p. 13). Nevertheless, we formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H1: The lower the objective costs are for households, the greater will be public support 
for incentive-based policy instruments. 
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2.2 Reducing perceived costs 
The cost factor in the individual benefit-cost calculation also could be altered by changing the 
perceptions of cost, which are related to their visibility (OECD 2006, p. 152). Although we 
have argued previously that incentive-based policy instruments are characterized by very visible 
costs, visibility is still a matter of degree. Variations in incentive-based instruments may create 
varying individual perceptions of the costliness of individual instruments. Incentive-based in-
struments typically involve taxes, which can be used to provide incentives to reduce non-desired 
behavior (e.g., taxes on electricity consumption), or to finance policies that stimulate desired 
behavior (e.g., grants-in-aid or feed-in tariffs, i.e., guaranteeing prices for fixed periods of time 
for electricity produced from renewable energy sources; see Goulder and Parry 2008; Howlett 
2005; Howlett and Ramesh 1993; Windhoff-Héritier 1987). In that context, Gingrich (2014) has 
argued that direct taxes (on income or revenue) are more salient to citizens than indirect taxes 
(on consumption). In other words, direct income and revenue taxes are perceived as costlier and 
more inescapable than indirect ones. Moreover, regarding the latter, a consumption tax that fol-
lows the “user pays” principle may not only appear avoidable to a certain extent, i.e., my per-
sonal behavior can influence how much I have to pay, but also better represent the norms of 
fairness and equality. Those latter aspects have been shown to be important triggers for public 
acceptance, mainly with respect to implementation processes (OECD 2006, p. 151, Wolsink 
2007), willingness to pay (Aijzen et al. 2000) and compliance with such measures (e.g., Hartner 
et al. 2008)—which implies that the arguments concerning fairness and equality also can be 
used to support policy measures:  
H2: Incentives funded by indirect taxes that follow the “user pays” principle rather 
than by direct (income) taxes are more likely to be supported by citizens. 
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2.3 Compensating the costs, or how to strengthen the benefit side 
The third strategy is to alter the benefit side of the benefit-cost equation. In other words, incen-
tive-based policy instruments need to provide some (perceived) benefits to voters that compen-
sate for the instruments’ costs. In other policy areas, particularly regarding welfare state re-
forms, compensation has been identified as a crucial mechanism for increasing public support of 
a proposal (Bonoli 2000; Häusermann 2010; Häusermann et al. 2016). Structurally, however, as 
previously discussed, incentive-based policy instruments are dominated by (short-term) costs, 
whereas a benefit, i.e., better environmental quality, tends to materialize only in the long-run 
and remains to a certain degree uncertain. In this context, we suggest two mechanisms by which 
compensation may occur.  
On the one hand, a measure may provide some material benefit. For example, when im-
plementing an environmental tax, the revenues collected from taxes on electricity or energy 
consumption may be redistributed to the taxpaying public. According to Kirchgässner (1997; 
see also Thalmann 2004), fully redistributing revenues from green taxes might be an important 
trigger for popular support. From a personal cost perspective, redistribution means that electrici-
ty-saving behavior may result in a financial benefit. In contrast, another classic example of an 
incentive-based policy instrument is the provision of economic incentives for technological in-
novation (e.g., investment funds, feed-in tariffs). From a household’s perspective, such policies 
are dominated by the cost side: households pay through taxes, whereas the main beneficiaries 
are business enterprises (and maybe also a small group of consumers, i.e., so-called prosumers). 
Hence, taking the cost compensation argument seriously, citizens should prefer redistribution 
over investment- or a performance-based instrument:  
H3: Citizens prefer incentive-based instruments that redistribute tax revenues to the 
taxpayers rather than spending the revenue on promoting the production of renewa-
ble electricity generation.  
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A second compensation mechanism works when voters are convinced that a policy in-
strument will have a future benefit, and when they hold a favorable attitude towards the target 
of that instrument. Put simply, if an individual thinks that a policy measure will be useful and 
effective for reaching a goal she/he supports, he/she will be more likely to be willing to bear the 
costs. Quite clearly, believing in the usefulness of renewable energy policies is contingent on 
environmental and ideological attitudes (we discuss this relationship in more detail below). 
However, we argue that the perception of how useful and effective an incentive-based instru-
ment will be also depends on policy design, i.e., the measures that an incentive-based instru-
ment contains. During the last decade, for example, feed-in tariffs have been considered to be 
the most effective tool for promoting the acceleration of renewable energy production (Couture 
and Gagnon 2010). In contrast to investment-based policy measures, feed-in tariffs reward actu-
al performance. However, most recently and against the background of the German experience, 
feed-in tariffs also have been criticized for being inefficient and too expensive owing to the 
over-market prices paid to the producers of renewable electricity.3  This discussion may have 
influenced some citizens’ perceptions of feed-in tariffs’ usefulness.   
H4: Citizens prefer incentive-based instruments that they perceive to be useful and effec-
tive means for achieving a formulated target. 
 
2.4 The logical extension: Differences based on ideological predisposition? 
                                                          
3  For example, see “Are the Legacy Costs of Germany’s Solar Feed-In Tariff Fixable?” 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/germany-moves-to-reform-its-renewable-energy-
law (retrieved on August 4, 2016) or “Ineffizient und zu teuer” http://www.nzz.ch/mei-
nung/kommentare/ineffizient-und-zu-teuer-1.18657976 (retrieved on August 4, 2016). 
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As mentioned previously, and even from a public choice perspective, citizens’ decisions on re-
newable electricity policies can be expected to be influenced by political and environmental 
values. Most generally, it has been show in various contexts that a left-green ideology, i.e., rat-
ing environmental protection as important, corresponds with a greater likelihood of voting envi-
ronmentally friendly (Bornstein and Lanz 2008; Bornstein and Thalmann 2004; Deacon and 
Shapiro 1975; Halbheer et al. 2006; Kahn and Matsusaka 1997, Sciarini, Bornstein and Lanz 
2007; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011). However, and most important in our context, ideological fac-
tors might not only affect the general electoral support for energy policies that promote renewa-
ble energy production and lower energy consumption, but also affect the costs and benefits of 
the voting decision (Bornstein and Lanz 2008, p. 431). For instance, given that center-right in-
dividuals tend to have weaker pro-environmental values (Bornstein and Thalmann 2004; Sci-
arini, Bornstein and Lanz 2007), the cost argument should particularly matter for their voting 
behavior. In contrast, leftwing voters may not only support more strongly the goal of renewable 
energy policies, but also be more inclined to believe in the usefulness and efficacy of these poli-
cies. Hence, a favorable attitude towards cost compensation may be more likely to occur in the 
latter voter group.  
In accordance with Bornstein and Lanz (2008, p. 431), considering ideological factors in 
an analysis of vote choice is not only a “logical extension” of the public choice approach, but 
also is important for capturing potential varying cost and benefit effects. Hence, to grasp the 
potentially different perceptions and evaluations of benefit-cost considerations by different vot-
er groups, we examine whether the role of specific policy instrument features vary contingent 
on a citizen’s ideological predisposition. 
 
3. Research design  
3.1 The methodological approach: A conjoint analysis 
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From the literature and the specific research question at hand, two major issues arise when in-
vestigating citizens’ support for proposals to promote renewable energy production and reduce 
energy consumption. First, support needs to be captured in a way that actually reflects voting 
behavior and not only mere opinions; second, we should recognize that support for incentive-
based policy measures at the ballot box involves multidimensional choices, i.e., a specific ballot 
proposal consists of various elements out of which a voter may like some while rejecting others. 
Therefore, an individual vote decision is the result of balancing the pros and cons of a proposal.   
Both issues can be approached methodically by implementing a factorial survey experi-
ment in which respondents are asked to rate various policy proposals (see Fig. 1). In contrast to 
single-item questions (e.g., “Would you support an incentive tax to reduce energy consump-
tion?”), the results of a factorial survey experiment reflect preferences for various designs of 
energy policy proposals and thus get closer to a realistic vote decision for which not a single 
attribute but a combination of multiple factors is relevant to the vote choice. Methodologically, 
this paper follows Hainmueller et al. (2014) and Bechtel et al. (2015) by applying a randomized 
conjoint design. Since each respondent is exposed to seven paired policy proposals, we were 
able to collect enough information on all of the different attribute combinations.  
To contextualize the stated preferences experiment, we explicitly asked respondents to 
envisage their decision as a vote that would be cast on the following Sunday. For each paired 
policy variant, respondents had to indicate which one she/he would choose in a confrontational 
vote (choice answer) as well as for both proposals individually, i.e., “how likely they would 
approve the variant in a referendum” on a scale from 0% to 100% in decimal steps (support 
answer). Such a design corresponds to a realistic ballot situation in Switzerland when the gov-
ernment presents a counterproposal to a popular initiative. In that case, citizens are asked (1) 
whether they are in favor of the two presented proposals individually and (2) which proposal 
they prefer if both receive a majority of votes. Thus, the electorate can accept both proposals on 
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the ballot (i.e., both proposals can receive more than 50%). If so, the proposal that receives 
more votes breaks the tie and will be implemented. More generally, the frequency of direct-
democratic ballots in Switzerland implies that Swiss respondents are quite familiar with the 
decision situation mimicked in the conjoint analysis, which can be expected to increase the va-
lidity and consistency of their responses.  
 
--- Fig. 1 about here --- 
 
Although an experiment never has the same consequences as a real-world vote and 
therefore by definition has advantages mainly with respect to internal rather than external va-
lidity, we argue that the chosen conjoint design offers ideal conditions for analyzing voter deci-
sions at the ballot for several additional reasons. First, we argue that deciding based on a con-
joint table (see Fig.1), i.e., the key elements of a proposal, corresponds quite closely to voters’ 
real-world decision-making. On the one hand, many citizens are likely not to be informed at a 
profound level about the proposal at stake, but rather take several key points mentioned in the 
pre-ballot campaign (and party positions) as cues for voting yes or no (Kriesi 2005, 2012; also 
see Chong & Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001; Lupia 2015). In that sense, the effect of the 
abstract content in a conjoint table (for example, compared with a vignette design) plausibly 
corresponds to mentioning the main issues that arise during a campaign, which eventually are 
weighed by citizens in making their decision. Second, the factorial survey experiment approach 
captures a citizen’s behavioral component by asking for his/her likely support (voting yes) in-
stead of how she/he feels about a certain policy instrument without providing the context of a 
specific policy proposal. Hence, we argue that the factorial survey design not only enables us to 
at least partly overcome the value-action gap (Bell et al. 2013; Kollmus and Agyeman 2002), 
- 14 - 
but also brings us closer to measuring actual support (van Rijnsoever et al. 2015; Dermont, In-
gold, Kammermann and Stadelmann-Steffen 2017) for the energy policy proposals studied. 
Third, a conjoint choice experiment perfectly fits our theoretical argument in that the support 
for policy instruments depends heavily on their specific components and how important it is to 
identify the combinations of those components that are most popular among citizens (Hain-
mueller et al. 2014: 3). Fourth, environmental policy questions are prone to a social desirability 
bias, i.e., people pretend to be more environmentally-friendly in surveys than they actually are. 
Conjoint experiments provide respondents with multiple reasons to justify a particular choice 
and rating, and thus have the potential to reduce social desirability bias (ibid.). 
 
3.2 Data 
The analyses presented herein are from Switzerland, the home of the most direct democratic 
decision making in the world. In the discussions about a transition from nuclear and fossil fuels 
to renewable sources of energy, the Swiss government in its Energy Strategy 2050 proposed, 
among other things, a steering scheme that minimizes state intervention as a long-term aim 
(Swiss Confederation 2015). Although a first set of measures that focused on the promotion of 
renewable energy production and greater energy efficiency was supported in a popular vote on 
May 21, 2017, still up for debate are whether and how to introduce such a steering system.   
The data set used in this contribution was collected between March and May, 2016. The 
trilingual survey4 on future energy provision in Switzerland contains 8,287 responses from a 
                                                          
4 The survey was conducted in German, French, and Italian, the three most frequently spoken of 
Switzerland’s four national languages. Participants filled out the survey 65.4% in German, 
26.0% in French, and 8.6% in Italian. Romansh individuals likely used the German version to 
respond to the survey. 
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representative sample provided by the Federal Office of Statistics, whereby respondents where 
invited by postal mail to participate in an online survey.5 The response rate after three invites 
was 41.7%. The demographic and structural composition of the final sample corresponds quite 
closely to the Swiss resident population (see Table A.2. in the Appendix). This is particularly 
true with respect to gender, civic status, and education. Foreigners living in Switzerland as well 
as citizens over 75 years of age had lower response rates, which likely is explained by the ex-
clusive use of an online survey. In terms of political orientation, the collected sample is very 
similar to the composition of Swiss voters according to the Swiss Election Study 2015 (Lutz 
2016), the exceptions being that support for the larger parties is comparatively stronger in our 
sample, and the ideological positions of the respondents on the left-right scale is somewhat less 
polarized.  
The survey comprised two conjoint modules, whereby respondents were assigned ran-
domly to one of the two. The module on policy support used in the present paper was answered 
by 4,146 individuals.  
A second data source on which we relied for the empirical part of our study is a survey 
that was conducted after a vote on a popular initiative called the “Green economy” in Septem-
ber 2016. That initiative, which was rejected clearly by the citizenry, aimed at committing the 
country to achieving a sustainable use of natural resources by 2050. The survey included five 
items (see Table A.4 in the Appendix) relating to the economic modeling assumptions of envi-
ronmental taxes to capture respondents’ agreement or disagreement with those assumptions. 
                                                          
5 The data collection process was conducted by the LINK Institute in Lucerne. The sample was 
provided by the Federal Office of Statistics from the “Stichprobenrahmen für Personen- und 
Haushaltserhebungen” (SRPH).  
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The sample representative of Switzerland was provided by Qualtrics, and also was conducted in 
three languages.  
 
3.3 Operationalization and implementation 
The main dependent variable indicates support for a given combination of attributes presented 
to individual survey respondents. Support for each proposal was recorded based on the rating 
question, i.e., individuals had to indicate how likely they were to cast a yes vote on a proposal at 
the ballot box (see Fig. 1). 6   
The conjoint setup varied on seven attributes (for a detailed description of the attributes, 
attribute levels and weights see Table A.1 in the Appendix), whereby—according to our hy-
potheses—we focus on three attributes for our analyses: the policy measure, how the measure is 
funded, and additional monthly cost per household. Moreover, four other attributes accounted 
for varying energy sources, the measure’s running time, whether exceptions are provided for 
energy intensive industries, and how to treat nuclear power plants. We presented the policy pro-
posals at random, i.e., reflecting random combinations of attribute levels. The exceptions were 
                                                          
6 Although the question format differs from a ballot context in which citizens must cast either a 
yes or no vote, similar rating questions typically are used in pre-poll surveys in Switzerland. It 
seems to be a suitable way of reducing the number of “don’t know” answers in a situation in 
which citizens may not (yet) be totally sure about whether to approve or reject a proposal. To 
test the robustness of our results, we also estimated the model using a binary coding specifica-
tion, i.e., individuals who indicated a high probability of voting yes (values of 8 or more out of 
10) were assigned a 1 (“support”), whereas all others were coded as 0 (“not support”). The re-
sults can be found in Figure A2 in the Appendix, and are almost identical to those presented in 
the main part of this paper.  
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for some illogical combinations of attribute levels, which we excluded. We used weights to ac-
count for these constraints in the estimations.  
The seven attributes were defined based on current public and political debates, and thus 
reflect “real” possible solutions for reducing the consumption of electricity and/or for the pro-
motion of renewable electricity production in Switzerland. Since some of the elements of the 
presented policy proposals were less well known by the electorate (given that no political cam-
paign on those issues was being carried out at the time of the data collection), we tried to pro-
vide some basic information on issues mentioned in the survey (explanations of the different 
energy sources and feed-in tariffs, among others). In addition to pop-up information, we placed 
a module with single-item questions on energy policy before the conjoint module to encourage 
respondents to reflect on these issues before answering the conjoint questions. In this vein, we 
compensated to a certain extent for the lack of a publicity campaign that usually precedes indi-
vidual decision making. 
Owing to the experimental setting and randomized presentation of attributes, and since 
our interest is in the marginal effects of policy features, the models do not consider control vari-
ables. However, to test whether the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) vary between 
societal groups, we estimated further models that considered the interaction effects of demo-
graphic and socio-economic characteristics (age, gender, education and language region). Those 
models, which are available in the supplementary material, demonstrate that the results present-
ed in the next section are quite consistent across groups.  
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present our empirical findings. First, we discuss the mean support rates 
across all policy packages—i.e., all possible policy combinations that were shown to the re-
spondents—so as to estimate the actual (un)popularity of the different variants of incentive-
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based proposals. In the second step, we focus on the specific elements of the policy combina-
tions to test our hypotheses empirically. Finally, in a third empirical step, we consider the dif-
ferences in support for incentive-based policies that depend on voters’ ideological predisposi-
tions.  
Fig. 2 documents the mean support rates across all possible policy proposals. Initially, it 
can be seen that the variance in mean support is considerable, ranging basically from almost 
zero to almost complete support. That finding must be considered against the background that 
the random combination of the seven policy attributes generates a lot of reasonable policy alter-
natives, but also produces some very extreme ones (e.g., a very expensive, long-lasting con-
sumption tax whereby revenues would be spent primarily on geothermal power) and some that 
would barely change anything compared to the status quo (e.g., a feed-in-tariff for renewable 
energy sources at no additional cost).  
However, the most important observation is that a majority of the proposals reaches a 
mean support of less than 50% (the plot has its highest density below a 50% support rate), 
which confirms that, on average, incentive-based policy proposals cannot build on broad popu-
lar support. Nevertheless, Fig. 2 also illustrates that a potential exists for incentive-based in-
struments to be accepted at the ballot box: for a considerable number of the incentive-based 
proposals (35%), a majority of the respondents indicated that they would (more) likely cast a 
yes vote. Hence, the question arises as to the characteristics of these potentially successful poli-
cy proposals.  
--- Fig. 2 about here --- 
 
4.1 Varying components of an electricity proposal: What improves the cost-benefit ratio?  
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To test which attributes hinder or boost support for a proposal, we rely on the so-called 
AMCE, which represents the “marginal effect of attribute averaged over the joint distribution of 
the remaining attributes” (Hainmueller et al. 2014, p. 10). Fig. 3 depicts the results of the con-
joint analysis of the three attributes on which we focus. 
Initially, we indeed observe that individuals rely heavily on the cost argument. As soon 
as a proposal involves any additional costs for households, the likelihood that an individual will 
support the proposition declines. These results strongly corroborate our crucial assumption that 
the cost factor is an inherent hurdle to citizens’ supporting incentive-based policy instruments. 
Moreover, the level of costs matters: a more or less linear and negative relationship exists be-
tween rising costs and the probability that a proposal will be supported by respondents. In other 
words, and in accordance with Hypothesis 1, the lower the costs involved, the more likely citi-
zens are to support an incentive-based policy proposal.  
According to Hypothesis 2, the role costs play in benefit-cost calculations also depends 
on the visibility of costs, and more precisely on how the money is collected. The analyses show 
that on the funding side, a consumption tax on electricity is preferred by citizens over proposals 
funded through general direct taxes or a value added tax (VAT). Put differently, policy 
measures that are funded by taxes on (non-renewable) electricity consumption are more likely 
to be supported by respondents than proposals that aim at funding measures financed by direct 
taxes or the VAT. Hence, these findings can be interpreted to mean that Swiss citizens generally 
support the “user pays” principle, which might be seen as fairer compared to general taxes. That 
result fits our theoretical expectations that less visible and more “escapable” costs receive 
stronger support from citizens (Hypothesis 2). However, the probability that respondents will 
support a specific proposal does not depend significantly on their choosing between the alterna-
tives of taxing electricity consumption in general (i.e., from renewable and non-renewable 
sources) or electricity consumption generated only from non-renewable sources.  
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--- Fig. 3 about here --- 
 
With respect to cost compensation (Hypotheses 3 and 4), we argued that citizens would 
prefer incentive-based instruments that involve some material benefits (e.g., redistribution of tax 
revenues) or perceived gains, i.e., the usefulness and efficacy of a policy measure. However, the 
estimation results initially demonstrate that citizens seem largely to be indifferent about the pol-
icy measure on the spending side. Their support is independent of whether the tax revenues are 
redistributed to the population or used to promote renewable energy production more specifical-
ly (e.g., through feed-in tariffs, investment grants, or tax relief).7 Thus, the empirical evidence 
does not support Hypothesis 3, which suggests that citizens would—based on a benefit-cost 
calculation—prefer a redistribution of tax revenues, which may even imply a material benefit 
for those who consume less energy. Similarly, the results also do not imply that citizens would 
be more supportive of measures aimed more directly at the target of a policy, e.g., investment 
grants or feed-in tariffs, which would make the effect (i.e., a benefit) more tangible and salient, 
as stated in Hypothesis 4. 
The explanation for this non-finding is at least twofold. On the one hand, the insignifi-
cant AMCE for the policy measures could just reflect a real and informed indifference to them. 
On the other hand, the indifference to the policy measures also could imply that citizens have 
difficulties understanding the varying incentive-based possibilities for reaching environmental 
targets, and in particular the logic of environmental taxes (Carrattini et al. 2016; OECD 2006; 
Thalmann 2004). If citizens do not understand or acknowledge a measure’s intended benefits, it 
                                                          
7  Further analysis not presented here, moreover, revealed that indifference between policy 
measures persists if the policy measures are interacted with the source of funding. 
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may not be considered in individual decision-making (statistically speaking, that attribute is not 
relevant to explaining policy support). Since a lack of information about a policy instrument 
could thus be an important reason for rejecting the unknown, support for incentive-based in-
struments could be strengthened by informing citizens about the economic assumptions under-
lying such instruments.  
With respect to our research question, the latter interpretation is particularly relevant. 
From the perspective of Hypothesis 4, it is quite clear that if people do not know or believe in 
the usefulness and efficacy of an environmental policy measure, any compensation related to its 
cost burden will not be made. Based on our original data, similar to previous research (e.g., Car-
rattini et al. 2016; Thalmann 2004), we could not test whether citizens actually understand and 
believe in the effectiveness of environmental taxes. For that reason, we integrated a five-item 
question into another population survey that focused on the popular initiative “Green economy,” 
which the Swiss people voted on in September 2016. The results are presented in Fig. 4.   
 
--- Fig. 4 about here --- 
 
 
As Fig. 4 illustrates, a plurality (rather) agrees that redistributing revenues from an ener-
gy tax to the taxpaying population does not lead to a reduction in energy consumption, and puts 
additional strain on public finances. These two findings demonstrate clearly that the economic 
assumptions of redistributive environmental taxes were not acknowledged by roughly half of 
the respondents. Interestingly, the opinions on the mechanisms of environmental taxes largely 
are independent of ideological predispositions (see Fig.A1 in the Appendix). However, that pat-
tern has one exception: voters on the left side of the political spectrum are more strongly con-
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vinced that a steering tax, i.e., a scheme where revenues from an environmental tax are redis-
tributed to the taxpaying population, actually reduces consumption. Overall, the findings sup-
port the conclusion that a substantial number of Swiss citizens do not believe in the neoclassical 
economic model and the assumptions underlying steering taxes, or do not understand their eco-
nomic implications. Hence, this finding further corroborates the conclusion that Hypothesis 4 
fails to be supported based on its fundamentals: given that citizens do not understand or believe 
in the efficacy of incentive-based policy instruments, a perceived benefit does not exist that 
could compensate for the costs.     
 
4.2 The influence of predisposition 
In a last analytical step, we examine the extent to which political ideology influences citizens’ 
decision-making on renewable energy policies, and in particular benefit-cost considerations. 
Fig. 4 depicts conditional AMCEs for respondents with left, middle, and right political predis-
positions as measured by their self-reported political ideologies. As discussed in the theoretical 
section of the present study, we particularly expect that voters from the political center and right 
will weight cost arguments more heavily than those from the left, whereas the latter may be 
more inclined to believe in the usefulness and efficacy of renewable energy measures.    
 
--- Fig. 5 about here --- 
 
However, the main message we take from Fig. 5 is that the patterns across the political 
left-right spectrum are astonishingly similar. Most importantly, voters across the political spec-
trum do not have clear preferences on environmental policy measures (i.e., feed-in-tariff, in-
vestment grants, tax relief or redistribution). For example, right-wing voters do not support 
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more strongly a pure steering system that would go along with limited state intervention, and 
left-wing voters do not express stronger support for measures that explicitly promote renewable 
energy production. However, Fig. 5 does indicate that left-wing voters tend to be slightly less 
averse to additional costs than voters from the political center and right, even though the general 
pattern does not differ. In addition, centrist and right-wing voters show stronger preferences for 
funding renewable electricity through an energy tax rather than by levying general direct or in-
direct taxes, whereas for leftist voters, no significant differences exist between the sources of 
funding.  
Thus, voters with different ideological predispositions do not vary much in their 
weighting of different policy components. However, Fig. 6 illustrates that the mean support 
across all possible policy combinations does differ between the ideological groups. As expected, 
support for policies to promote renewable energy and reduce energy consumption is greatest for 
leftist voters, whereas voters in the middle and the right of the political spectrum are less likely 
to support such proposals in a popular vote (the means, represented by the dashed lines in each 
density plot, drop from 49.5% to 46.3% and to 43.9% for voters in the middle and the right, 
respectively). Also, those differences show that approval rates for all ideological groups vary 
between total opposition to total support. As mentioned previously, the sample of proposals 
contains a very diverse set of policy combinations, including both very far-reaching proposals 
as well as policy combinations that would not contribute much to achieving environmental poli-
cy targets. Therefore, this diverse set of policy combinations gives both environmentally friend-
ly (typically left-wing) respondents and those who are more reluctant to support environmental 
policies (typically rightist individuals) reasons to (strongly) support some policies and (strong-
ly) reject others. Considering all the combinations, the average still exhibits a small but relevant 
difference for support for all possible policy proposals to promote renewable energy generation. 
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--- Fig. 6 about here --- 
 
5. Conclusion 
The starting point of the present study was the puzzle about why citizens are reluctant to accept 
incentive-based energy policies even though such instruments are widely acknowledged by 
economists and policy makers to be the most effective means of attaining the goals of environ-
mental policy in general and energy policy in particular. We argued that to learn more about the 
political difficulties of implementing incentive-based policy instruments, we should go beyond 
the traditional distinctions between incentive-based, regulatory and persuasive instruments, and 
look more closely at the varying elements of which specific incentive-based instruments consist. 
Most importantly, we showed that incentive-based policies are characterized by a particular cost 
structure, i.e., those instruments inherently involve some costs that typically are visible to vot-
ers. Hence, the main question that arises—which is the focus of the present study—is what fea-
tures and mechanisms could compensate for or reduce those inherent costs and thus increase 
citizens’ support for the policy instruments. Thus, we proposed and empirically tested three 
mechanisms that may alter the benefit-cost ratios of incentive-based instruments: reducing the 
objective costs, reducing the perceived costs, and increasing the benefits. Based on a conjoint 
analysis conducted in Switzerland, the main findings of our analyses are summarized in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. 
Most importantly, our results demonstrate that reducing objective and perceived costs 
may indeed strengthen voter support for incentive-based policy instruments, whereas cost com-
pensation does not seem to work as well. More precisely, our findings suggest that costs are still 
the most relevant factor influencing individual decision-making with respect to incentive-based 
instruments. The analyses reveal that the negative relationship between costs per household and 
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policy support essentially is linear. In other words, designing an incentive-based policy instru-
ment in a modest way, i.e., limiting the visible costs, will increase its level of support. That 
finding  not only accords with previous research suggesting “gradual implementation” of these 
instruments (Dresner et al. 2006; OECD 2006), but also is in line with recent findings from 
Switzerland, which identified low household costs as an important factor underlying the success 
of the new energy law accepted by Swiss citizens in May 2017.8 Of course, the downside of that 
policy mechanism is that a lower energy tax, for example, also will limit its efficacy. Moreover, 
and regarding the perception of costs, the analyses in the present study support the view that 
incentive-based policy instruments are more likely to be supported if they involve taxes per-
ceived as fair and to a certain degree avoidable. In that context, the “user pays” principle is 
widely accepted by citizens and is clearly preferred over general income taxes or the VAT. 
In contrast, the results suggest that no policy measure has a clear positive effect on the 
support for incentive-based instruments. Thus, we found no evidence that a particular measure 
to promote renewable energy could increase the perceived benefit of a policy proposal and thus 
compensate for higher costs in the benefit-cost ratio. Most interestingly, an instrument that re-
distributes tax revenues back to the taxpaying population, and thus most clearly involves a ma-
terial benefit, seems not to increase support more than proposals requiring the state to invest in 
the promotion of renewable energy production. Based on additional data, we were able to show 
that  substantial numbers of voters, sometimes even a majority, do not understand or are not 
convinced by economic arguments favoring environmental taxes, an aspect of such policy 
measures that often has been assumed, but never has been tested explicitly before (see also 
Carattini et al. 2016; Clinch and Dunne 2006). That phenomenon imposes tight constraints on 
popular support for those policy instruments. To put it bluntly, since citizens do not understand 
                                                          
8 http://www.defacto.expert/2017/07/18/das-ja-zum-energiegesetz-breite-zustimmung-zur-
energiestrategie-oder-hart-erarbeiteter-erfolg/ (retrieved: November 22, 2017). 
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or believe in the usefulness and efficacy of incentive-based instruments, why should they be 
ready to pay for and thus support such proposals? Thus, in the context of environmental 
measures that may provide benefits to society in a general way (i.e., as public goods), but not 
necessarily to individuals specifically,9 policy makers need to better explain and suggest to vot-
ers why incentive-based instruments can deliver benefits in the longer-run.  
Furthermore, when taking into account political ideology, our findings demonstrate an 
astonishing similarity amongst voter groups. Whereas, theoretically, we expected differences in 
benefit-cost considerations between voter groups, our analyses show that, across all parts of the 
political spectrum, voters seem to focus heavily on cost arguments, whereas a measure’s specif-
ic elements are much less relevant. Ex ante support for incentive-based energy policies is in 
general, and across the full political spectrum, rather lukewarm, which points to the crucial im-
portance of pre-ballot publicity campaigns. Although our survey has been carried out in a non-
campaign context, future research could look profitably at whether and how preferences for 
various policy proposals change during a public debate. 
Although the present study focused on Switzerland and cannot necessarily be general-
ized to other contexts, we argue that our main results are relevant beyond the Swiss case. Taxes 
and steering systems vary between nations and across sub-national jurisdictions, but they are 
based on “universal” economic models and generally consist of rather complex bundles of poli-
cy measures. Hence, it can be assumed that a lack of understanding about, and acknowledgment 
of, the economic assumptions of incentive-based policy instruments are also realities in other 
contexts and, hence, also may be important factors for the broader unpopularity of such instru-
ments (also see OECD 2008, p. 25). A lack of popular support for incentive-based policy 
measures also may hinder their implementation in purely representative political systems in 
                                                          
9  However, exceptions, such as increases in property values, are possible (see Deacon and 
Shapiro 1975). 
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which governments might be reluctant to promote such unpopular policies owing to fear of elec-
toral punishment. Still, more research is needed to clarify these results and, most importantly, to 
investigate their policy implications. First, it remains an open question whether incentive-based 
instruments are victims of their own non-success. In fact, according to economic models, incen-
tive-based instruments would be most effective if the disincentives for non-desired behavior 
(e.g., energy consumption) were strong. However, because of the political challenges of intro-
ducing such effective instruments, existing taxes typically are rather low. Thus, even if econom-
ic models were right, their real-world benefits (e.g., reduced energy consumption) may currently 
be limited because incentives are too weak. In turn, that lack of success can further hinder citi-
zens’ support for economic models. Moreover, and coming back to the question of whether and 
how the popularity of these instruments could be strengthened , our results imply that infor-
mation and communication may play important roles in increasing public support for incentive-
based measures. In this vein, further research should reflect on when and how to inform citizens 
so to fill their knowledge gaps, and also to convince them that economic models can meet their 
expectations in the real world.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Attribute list and levels used in the conjoint analysis. 
 
ATTRIBUTES LEVELS WEIGHTS / CONSTRAINTS 
Energy Source  
Priority 
Renewable energy in general 26/100 
Solar power 16/100 
 Wind power 16/100 
 Small-scale hydro power 16/100 
 Geothermal power 16/100 
 No specific target 10/100 
Source of Funding General tax revenues 1/4 
 Added-value tax 1/4 
 Tax on electricity (VAT) 1/4, != Redistribution, exceptions* 
 Tax on electricity from non-renewable sources 1/4, != Redistribution, exceptions* 
Policy Measure Investment grants for the construction of a new plant 27/100 
 Feed-in tariff for renewable electricity 27/100 
 Tax reductions for firms that produce renewa-ble electricity 26/100 
 Redistribution to the population 20/100, != General tax rev., VAT* 
Costs No additional costs 1/5 
 Around 8. — CHF additional monthly costs 1/5 
 Around 15. — CHF additional monthly costs 1/5 
 Around 23. — CHF additional monthly costs 1/5 
 Around 30. — CHF additional monthly costs 1/5 
Exceptions No exceptions 1/4 
 for energy intensive industries 3/4, != General tax rev., VAT* 
Nuclear Power Plants Close down within 5 years 1/3 
 Maturity restriction of 60 years 1/3 
 No maturity restriction 1/3 
Running Time for 10 years 1/3 
 for 20 years 1/3 
 for 35 years 1/3 
 
Notes: The attributes and levels were assigned to each task in a randomized way (see Hainmueller et al. 2014). 
*These combinations were excluded from the conjoint designs, since they do not represent reasonable variants of 
renewable electricity proposals. 
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Individuals 4,146 for conjoint on policies 
Conjoint Ratings 7 tasks * 2 concepts * 4,146 individuals = 58,044 
Support  
from 1 (no support) to 11 (full support) mean = 5.573 
  
Language  
 German 66% 
 French 26% 
 Italian 9% 
Gender  
 male 53% 
 female 47% 
Age  
 18–35 years 27% 
 36–50 years 29% 
 51–65 years 28% 
 65+ years 16% 
Education  
 low (no education, mandatory, pro-fessional) 47% 
 middle (middle/higher professional) 22% 
 high (tertiary) 31% 
Income  
 low (<4’999 CHF) 26% 
 middle (5’000-8’999 CHF) 40% 
 high (>=9’000 CHF) 34% 
Left/Right  
 left 23% 
 middle 52% 
 right 26% 
 
Notes: Summary statistics refer to the subsample of individuals who answered the conjoint module.  
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Table A.3. Citizens understanding of environmental taxes and modes of revenue recycling—the 
five items. 
 
1 An energy tax decreases energy consumption because it makes the consumption of energy more expensive. 
2 If revenues from an energy tax are redistributed to the population, energy consumption will not decrease. 
3 An energy tax is a means to make those pay more who consume more energy. Saving energy means paying 
less. 
4 If revenues from an energy tax are redistributed to the population, this puts an additional strain on public 
finances. 
5 If revenues from an energy tax are used to reduce employers’ contributions to a pension fund, the energy tax 
has a double positive effect: reduction of energy consumption and an increase in employment. 
Note: Response categories: Agree, rather agree, rather disagree, disagree, don’t know. Source: Own online survey 
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Table A.4. Full results of model 1. 
 
  AMCE 
Source of Funding (Baseline = tax on electricity)  
    Tax on non-renewable electricity -0.02 
 (0.05) 
    Income and revenue tax -0.11* 
 (0.05) 
    Value added tax -0.20*** 
 (0.05) 
Policy Measure (Baseline = feed-in tariff)  
    Investment grants 0.04 
 (0.04) 
    Tax relief 0.05 
 (0.04) 
    Redistribution 0.03 
 (0.08) 
Costs (Baseline = none)  
    +8 CHF -0.12*** 
 (0.04) 
    +15 CHF -0.33*** 
 (0.04) 
    +23 CHF -0.48*** 
 (0.04) 
    +30 CHF -0.68*** 
 (0.04) 
Exceptions (Baseline = no exceptions)  
    Industry -0.14*** 
 (0.03) 
Running Time (Baseline = 10 years)  
    20 years -0.04 
 (0.03) 
    35 years -0.06* 
 (0.03) 
Energy Source Priority (Baseline = no priority)  
    Renewable energy in general 0.75*** 
 (0.13) 
    Solar power 0.75*** 
 (0.13) 
    Wind power 0.44*** 
 (0.13) 
    Small-scale hydro power 0.43** 
 (0.13) 
    Geothermal power 0.28* 
 (0.13) 
Nuclear Power Plants (Baseline = switch off)  
    Switch off 0.48*** 
 (0.04) 
    60 years run-time limit 0.16*** 
 (0.03) 
Number of obs. 58,100 
Number of respondents 4,146 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
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Table A.5. Full results of model 1 – depending on ideological predispositions 
  AMCE left middle right 
Source of Funding (Baseline = tax on electricity)     
    Tax on non-renewable electricity -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) 
    Income and revenue tax -0.11* -0.17 -0.12 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) 
    Value added tax -0.21*** -0.13 -0.22** -0.25* 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.1) 
Policy Measure (Baseline = feed-in tariff)     
    Investment grants 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.1) 
    Tax relief 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.10 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.1) 
    Redistribution 0.02 0.24 -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.11) (0.18) 
Costs (Baseline = none)     
    +8 CHF -0.12** 0.02 -0.15** -0.17* 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
    +15 CHF -0.30*** -0.13 -0.32*** -0.4*** 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
    +23 CHF -0.47*** -0.28*** -0.52*** -0.53*** 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
    +30 CHF -0.66*** -0.44*** -0.68*** -0.81*** 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
Exceptions (Baseline = no exceptions)     
    Industry -0.15*** -0.22** -0.16*** -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
Running Time (Baseline = 10 years)     
    20 years -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
    35 years -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Energy Source Priority (Baseline = no priority)     
    Renewable energy in general 0.79*** 1.17*** 0.79*** 0.55* 
 (0.13) (0.30) (0.17) (0.28) 
    Solar power 0.78*** 1.26*** 0.75*** 0.52 
 (0.14) (0.32) (0.18) (0.29) 
    Wind power 0.42** 1.01** 0.38* 0.06 
 (0.14) (0.31) (0.18) (0.29) 
    Small-scale hydro power 0.45** 0.70* 0.45* 0.31 
 (0.14) (0.31) (0.18) (0.29) 
    Geothermal power 0.29* 0.71* 0.28 0.07 
 (0.14) (0.32) (0.18) (0.29) 
Nuclear Power Plants (Baseline = switch off)     
    Switch off 0.48*** 1.34*** 0.53*** -0.37*** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) 
    60 years run-time limit 0.18*** 0.37*** 0.26*** -0.16** 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
Number of obs.  51,618    
Number of respondents 3,683    
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05     
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Fig. A1: What citizens of different political predispositions think about the elements of environmental taxes and 
modes of revenue recycling. Note: Share of respondents per category in %. Source: Own data collected in the con-
text of the vote on the popular initiative “Green economy,” September 2016. Representative national sample, N = 
912. The precise formulation of the items can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Fig. A2: Policy attributes and the probability that a proposal is chosen. Dependent variable: support as a dummy, 
coded ‘1’ for values higher than or equal 8, and ‘0’ for lower values. Note: Average Marginal Component Effect 
(mean and 95% confidence interval). Full results can be found in the supplemental material. 
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To promote electricity production from renewable energies (small hydro power, solar power, 
wind power, geothermal power), the federal government wants to provide new means. This 
could be implemented in different ways.  
Characteristics Variant 1 Variant 2 
Energy source to be promoted   
Financed through   
Measure   
Costs per household   
Exceptions   
Existing nuclear power plants   
Running time   
   
Which of the two variants do you prefer?  
 
  
   
How likely is it that you would approve the variants in a referendum? 
Variant 1 
 0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%    100% 
                                                                   
Variant 2 
 0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%    100% 
                                                                   
Fig. 1: Experimental Design: Setup of the question with the choice and support answers. The attribute order was 
randomized, whereby the two dimensions “Financed through” and “Measure” where kept together. 
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Fig. 2: Support of electricity policy proposals; mean reported support per proposal. 
  
- 42 - 
 
Fig. 3: Policy attributes and the probability that a proposal is chosen. Note: Average Marginal Component Effect 
(mean and 95% confidence interval). Full results can be found in Table A.4. 
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Fig. 4: What citizens think about elements of environmental taxes and modes of revenue recycling. Note: Share of 
respondents per category in percentages. Source: Our own data collected in the context of the vote on the popular 
initiative “Green economy,” September 2016. Representative national sample N = 1,024. The precise formulation 
of the items can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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Fig. 5: The effect of policy components by party-ideological voter groups. Note: Average Marginal Component 
Effect (mean and 95% confidence interval).  
  
- 45 - 
 
 
Fig. 6: Support of electricity policy proposals by political predisposition. Mean reported support per proposal. The 
dashed line represents the mean for each group, which is at 49.5% for left voters, 46.3% for the middle, and 43.9% 
for voters on the right. 
 
